The Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) has filed a lawsuit against the government of President Bola Tinubu over “the failure to withdraw the patently unlawful mass phone-tapping rules known as ‘Lawful Interception of Communications Regulations, 2019.’”
The lawsuit followed allegations by the former Kaduna State Governor, Nasir El-Rufai that the National Security Adviser (NSA), Nuhu Ribadu’s phone conversation was intercepted. Mr. El-Rufai reportedly claimed, “The NSA’s call was tapped. They do that to our calls too, and we heard him saying they should arrest me.”
In the suit number ECW/CCJ/APP/11/26 filed last Friday at the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, Abuja, SERAP is seeking: “a declaration that the failure of the government to withdraw the Interception of Communications Regulations is unlawful and a violation of Nigeria’s international human rights obligations.”
SERAP is seeking “a declaration that the failure of the government to withdraw the Interception of Communications Regulations constitutes an official endorsement of unlawful mass phone-tapping rules, as the Regulations are patently unlawful, and violate the rule of law, democratic principles, and the right to privacy.”
SERAP is also seeking “an order directing and compelling the Nigerian government to immediately withdraw the Interception of Communications Regulations, and to commence a legislative process to ensure that any interception regulations are in conformity with Nigeria’s international human rights obligations.”
In the suit, SERAP is arguing that, “the Regulations establish a sweeping mass phone-tapping regime that violates Nigerians’ constitutionally and internationally guaranteed human rights including to privacy and freedom of expression.”
SERAP is also arguing that, “Where powers affecting fundamental human rights are exercised in secrecy and concentrated in political authorities without independent supervision, the risks of arbitrariness are substantial.”
According to SERAP, “Surveillance measures that lack strict necessity, proportionality and independent judicial oversight can easily be weaponised against political opponents, journalists, civil society actors and election observers.”
SERAP is also arguing that, “The Regulations also raise serious concerns as Nigeria approaches the 2027 general elections. Broad and weakly safeguarded interception powers create a real risk of abuse during politically sensitive periods.”
The suit filed on behalf of SERAP by its lawyers, Kolawole Oluwadare, Oluwakemi Oni, Valentina Adegoke and Maryam Mumuni, read in part: “Secret surveillance and bulk data collection create a permanent risk of misuse, profiling and abuse, particularly given the formidable technologies available to state authorities.”
“The mere retention or storage of personal data relating to an individual’s private life constitutes an interference with this right—whether or not the data is subsequently accessed or used.”
“In an electoral climate, even the perception that private communications are being monitored can chill political organising, investigative reporting and voter mobilisation.”
“The Regulations grant overly broad and vague powers to intercept communications on grounds such as ‘national security,’ ‘economic wellbeing,’ and ‘public emergency,’ without adequate judicial safeguards, independent oversight, transparency, or effective remedies.”
“Free and fair elections depend on confidential communications, protected journalistic sources and open democratic debate. Any misuse of intercepted data for intimidation, political advantage or disinformation would fundamentally undermine Nigerians’ right to political participation and electoral integrity.”
“As 2027 approaches, interception powers must be narrowly defined, subject to prior independent judicial authorisation and backed by effective remedies. Without robust safeguards, these Regulations risk threatening privacy rights, freedom of expression and the credibility of Nigeria’s democratic process.”
“Any restriction on the right to privacy must strictly comply with the principles of legality, necessity and proportionality. The Regulations fail all three tests.”
“The Regulations normalise surveillance as routine state practice and invert the presumption of privacy by criminalising interception except as permitted under the Regulations.”
“The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has made it unequivocally clear: mass surveillance programmes based on indiscriminate and blanket collection of personal data are arbitrary per se and can never satisfy the requirements of legality, necessity, and proportionality.”
“The Nigerian government has a positive obligation to adopt clear laws, effective safeguards, independent oversight mechanisms and accessible remedies to prevent abuse. These duties extend not only to state agencies but also to private actors, including telecommunications providers and technology companies.”
“The Nigerian Communications Commission (the Commission) while purportedly exercising its powers under section 70 of the Nigerian Communications Act, 2003 adopted the ‘Lawful Interception of Communications Regulations, 2019 (The Regulations).”
“Under Regulation 4, broad discretionary interception powers are granted to the National Security Adviser and the State Security Services, with minimal clarity regarding the scope or limits of such discretion.”
“The provision also extends to communications within and outside Nigeria and grants blanket immunity to licensees acting ‘in good faith.’ Such broad and vaguely defined powers create significant risks of abuse, including political misuse.”
“The inconsistencies in the Regulations create serious legal concerns. Regulation 4(1) limits interception powers to the National Security Adviser (NSA) and the State Security Services (SSS), and Regulation 12(1) reiterates this restriction.”
“However, Regulation 23 on ‘Interpretation’ expands the category of ‘authorised agencies’ to include additional bodies such as the Nigeria Police Force, National Intelligence Agency, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, and any other agency the Commission may designate.”
“This creates ambiguity and undermines legal certainty. Nigerians cannot reasonably know which authorities are empowered to intercept their communications, making the Regulations unpredictable and prone to arbitrary application and abuse.”
“By delegating authority to the Commission to expand the list at its discretion, Regulation 23 effectively grants unfettered administrative power, contrary to constitutional guarantees of privacy under Section 37 of the Nigerian Constitution and Nigeria’s binding international human rights obligations.”
“Such regulatory ambiguity threatens the rule of law, weakens accountability mechanisms, and increases the risk of abuse, particularly in politically sensitive contexts or during elections. Clear, narrowly defined statutory limits are essential wherever state authorities are empowered to intrude upon private communications.”
